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ABSTRACT. As Covid-19 disrupts political and economic arrangements around the world,                     
International Political Economy (IPE) is uniquely positioned to reflect on the pandemic’s global                         
economic and financial impact. To explore what IPE research can bring to the table, we situate state                                 
and market crisis responses within patterns of continuity and change in core structures of the                             
international political economy as well as developments in everyday life. Spanning themes from the                           
role of industrial animal farming and global value chains in spreading the virus to how the pandemic                                 
affects foreign aid, the politics of IMF aid disbursements, distributional conflicts within the                         
European Union and surveillance capitalism, we outline research agendas for scholars and students                         
of International Relations and International Political Economy to examine the origins, spread and                         
responses to Covid-19 in years to come. 
KEYWORDS​: Covid-19; international political economy; capitalism; global value chains; foreign aid; 
International Monetary Fund; European Union; surveillance. 
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The origins and consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic are not only epidemiological.                       
Transmission of the virus—both animal to human and human to human—has been facilitated by                           
political decisions that govern socio-economic activities occurring within, at, and across national                       
borders. As the organization of how we eat, work, move, consume, and play are all implicated in the                                   
outbreak and evolution of the pandemic, understanding whether and how arrangements governing                       
the global political economy will hold up or evolve is an urgent task. It is also a daunting task given                                       
the complexity and fluidity of the many global processes caught up in the pandemic, which remain                               
shrouded in uncertainty.  
This report discusses how International Political Economy can help us to understand                       
patterns of change and continuity in the wake of Covid-19. The contributions share the traditional                             
IPE focus on state-market relations at different levels of governance, as well as how they shape and                                 
are shaped by what is much more than a health crisis. The individual contributions, which address                               
the economic, ethical, financial, and political contexts of the pandemic, reflect our research                         
backgrounds and interests as we point to further pathways for IPE research. This introduction                           
3 
 
overviews patterns of continuity and change identified in the contributions and addressed within IPE                           
more generally. 
Continuity and change in times of pandemic 
A central preoccupation of IPE is how crises shape, or fail to shape, international relationships.                             
Whether one traces the field’s origins to the restructuring of the world economy in the 1970s or                                 
draws a longer lineage to the “moral philosophers” who studied capitalism’s expansion and                         
overturning of earlier socio-economic relations (Cohen 2019; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner                     
1998; Underhill 2002; Ravenhill 2007), IPE can be seen as an (inter-)discipline concerned with                           
patterns of continuity and change stemming from periods of abnormality. As Hobson and Seabrooke                           
(2007, 4) put it, “the aim of the study of IPE is to find out how political and economic change occurs                                         
within the world economy.” 
The Covid-19 pandemic’s ​outbreak can be traced to both continuities and changes in modes                           
of production and distribution as well as in their governance. Although the persistence of traditional                             
“wet markets” selling bush and live animals has been internationally condemned for enabling the                           
SARS-CoV-2 virus to jump to humans, Voelkner points out that the origins of the virus are related to                                   
deeper structural economic transformations. Large-scale shifts towards industrial food production                   
and globalized farming are bound up with the evolution and transmission of viruses among animals,                             
while the unprecedented degradation of wildlife habitats and increasingly close contact between                       
animals and humans have provided conditions ripe for zoonotic disease. Patterns of                       
political-economic continuity and change also inform the spread of SARS-CoV-2 around the globe.                         
Hyper-connected twenty-first century value chains meant that, from its initial appearance in China,                         
SARS-CoV-2 has leapt to industrial heartlands around the world, notably appearing in globally                         
connected industrial regions such as Northern Italy and Southern Germany before tourist cities like                           
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Rome and Berlin. While diseases have long been transmitted along trade routes, the unprecedented                           
speed of “just-in-time” international exchange (cf. Linsi, this report) ensured that the virus spread                           
faster than authorities could respond. The valorization of “efficiency” in global production, trade,                         
and health (Sell and Williams 2020) has ensured an equally efficient virus. By situating the roots of                                 
the pandemic in longstanding patterns of continuity and change, the contributions draw our attention                           
to the arrangements governing the production and international circulation of “things.”  
The contributions to this report also point to patterns of continuity and change in the                             
solutions proposed to combat the pandemic. Although international coordination through the G7 and                         
G20, as seen in the last financial crisis, is glaringly absent, we draw attention to a number of other                                     
forms of global coordination. Egger in her contribution assesses the possibilities for private flows of                             
foreign aid to alleviate suffering; Metinsoy considers how advice from the International Monetary                         
Fund—that governments increase public spending—overturns decades of conditionality imposed on                   
borrowing countries. Fuller in his contribution discusses how once-fervent opponents of debt                       
mutualization in the Eurozone have become advocates of shared debt, while Linsi highlights how                           
multinational firms are responding to calls to re-shore rather than outsource production abroad. In                           
their respective contributions, Voelkner and Campbell-Verduyn point to how large multinational                     
pharmaceutical and technology firms are shedding the image of big pharma and big tech as                             
tax-dodging villains to become key protagonists in the international race to develop effective vaccines                           
and contact tracing. These contributions suggest how, in some ways, “this time is different.”  
At the same time, the contributions consider whether responses undertaken in the heat of                           
the moment are part of longer and broader trends, and whether they will leave any lasting impression                                 
in the long run. Linsi notes that trends towards the re-shoring of global supply chains pre-date                               
Covid-19; Egger doubts that private flows of foreign aid have displaced public flows and                           
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international donor relationships. IMF responses, Metinsoy reflects, may be a kind of “back to the                             
future” in which Keynesian tenets inform advice, while Fuller considers continuities in the morality                           
underlying the views of key German voters. Campbell-Verduyn and Voelkner each doubt whether                         
the pre-pandemic backlash against large pharmaceutical firms and “techlash” against technology                     
firms will dissipate. In injecting skepticism regarding the extent to which “this time is different,” the                               
contributions identify pathways for future IPE research.  
Crisis in IPE—IPE in crisis? 
Crises are not only objects of analysis for IPE; they are moments to reflect on the strengths and                                   
weaknesses of the (inter-)discipline’s existing approaches. The herd behavior and limits to human                         
rationality witnessed in the financial meltdown of 2007-08, for instance, revealed the limitations of                           
overly rationalist theorizing, leading to a push to integrate insights from behavioral psychology and                           
literary analyses into IPE (Nelson and Katzenstein 2014). The contributions to this report suggest                           
two paths to generate and enhance connections between areas of research that the Covid-19                           
pandemic has exposed as insufficiently developed in the IPE literature. 
The first is how “the ideational” materializes. While the “ideational turn” in studies of crisis                             
has focused on how abnormal events are understood and acted upon, the pandemic highlights the                             
need to better understand the mechanisms through which ideas, conceptions, and worldviews lead—                         
or fail to lead—to change. Moving from “ideational battles” towards how institutions and other                           
material “things” enable or disable certain ideas from impacting the world is an important task for                               
IPE going forward. More specifically, Metinsoy in her contribution argues for bridging material and                           
ideational approaches when considering how notions of “good governance” sediment, or fail to                         
sediment, into policy advice. While the IMF’s research department has long entertained alternative                         
views on conditionality, most notably in the wake of the 2007-08 global financial crisis, these ideas                               
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often did not inform concrete advice from the IMF’s executive branch; when and how ideas                             
materialize across international bureaucracies is just as important as studying how they interact and                           
“scale up” into global policy making. In his contribution, Fuller indicates the need for further                             
research on how individual perspectives on debt and moral views on creditor-debtor relationships                         
affect national and regional policy-making. Similarly, Egger calls for further research on how distinct                           
individual notions of solidarity can facilitate different types of aid. Linsi in turn highlights how                             
material infrastructures such as global production chains reflect socio-political attitudes as much as                         
economic considerations. The focus on the meso-level connecting the micro- and macro-levels also                         
underpins Campbell-Verduyn’s call to trace how ideas of privacy become materially grounded in                         
international experiments to repurpose technologies in public-private partnerships formed in                   
response to the pandemic.  
A second path for future IPE research involves greater focus on non-human elements and                           
their interconnectedness with human activity. Technological infrastructures, material production                 
networks, animals, and viruses are not entirely under human control. As the Covid-19 crisis                           
illustrates, they operate partly independently of the humans that co-constitute them. Voelkner                       
highlights how microbes and animals can shape the course of international affairs (and how they                             
have repeatedly done so in history). Campbell-Verduyn and Linsi both point to the potential of                             
complex systems—whether digital blockchains or global production networks—to generate dynamics                   
that can ricochet human actions in unintended ways. IPE can provide insights into how choices to                               
govern, or not to govern, these “vital-lethal entanglements” (Voelkner, this issue) between the human                           
and non-human have been made, and might—and should—be shaped in the future.  
Two caveats are necessary. This report leaves untouched many other themes that warrant                         
greater attention by IPE scholars. Some themes that have long been neglected in the (inter-)discipline                             
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have gained new dimensions and urgency in the context of the pandemic. These include regional                             
differences, as well as racialized and gendered realities and portrayals of the origins, impacts, and                             
responses to the virus (cf. Hozic and True 2016; Singh 2020). The evolution of investor-state dispute                               
settlement mechanisms where multinational corporations might seek compensation for falling                   
revenues due to COVID-19 measures will be an important indicator of continuity and change in                             
state-market relations (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al 2020). The pandemic also introduces new                     
dynamics into the role of civil society as a counterbalancing force to both state and market power,                                 
and national health systems’ dependency on pharmaceuticals produced commercially, and abroad.  
In sum, the Covid-19 pandemic exposes a number of underexplored themes in IPE while                           
highlighting the strengths of the discipline’s focus on state-market relations in, at, and across national                             
boundaries. The key theories, models, and concepts of IPE are fluid, and the pandemic will serve as a                                   
“stress test” and impetus to better integrate both unknown unknowns and known unknowns.                         
Illuminating patterns of continuity and change underpinning the outbreak, evolution, and resolution                       








“It is perhaps a rude blow to the ​amour propre​ of our species to think that … mindless viruses can shape our 
international affairs. But they can.” (McNeill 2010, 2) 
The Covid-19 pandemic reveals how deeply and irrevocably human bodies are entangled                       
with non-human bodies including microorganisms (microbes) such as viruses and bacteria and                       
animals such as bats and civet cats. Never entirely inhibited by human attempts to prevent their                               
circulation, microbial strains move biologically and socially within and across species over global                       
trade and migratory routes connecting distant geographies. ​Like other recent outbreaks of infectious                       
disease—pandemic influenza, Ebola (the 2013-16 West Africa outbreak and the 2018-20 DRC                       
outbreak), HIV, and other coronavirus outbreaks (the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)                       
since 2012 and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003)—Covid-19 is a viral disease                             
of zoonotic origin. Zoonoses or zoonotic diseases are infectious diseases caused by a pathogen—a                           
disease-producing agent such as a virus—that has transmitted from an animal to the human species,                             
subsequently spreading between humans. Throughout history, zoonotic diseases have caused major                     
morbidity (illness) and mortality (death) in human populations, partially or wholly affecting the                         
stability of political and economic systems. The current turmoil in the global political economy                           
repeats this pattern.  
Interspecies spillovers—when a virus or bacteria jumps from its host species (e.g. bats,                         
warthogs, ticks) to another species (e.g. humans, pigs, chickens) and spreads through its new host                             
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population—also take place between wildlife and livestock. Historically, such spillovers have led to                         
illness and death in both wildlife and livestock, with major impacts on agriculture. The outbreak of                               
mad cow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, BSE) in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and                             
1990s led to losses in production, export restrictions, and the culling of four million cows to prevent                                 
the further transmission of the disease among livestock as well as humans. In what follows, I argue                                 
that anthropogenic activities, specifically modern livestock farming, facilitate both the emergence of                       
infectious diseases as well as the acceleration of antimicrobial resistance (the growing immunity of                           
infectious bacteria and viruses to available antibiotic and antiviral treatment). Their short and                         
long-term implications require rethinking some of the foundational principles underlying IR and IPE. 
Anthropogenic drivers of infectious diseases 
Although we still do not know where SARS CoV-2, the viral strain causing Covid-19, originated, we                               
know that human actions increase the risk of infectious diseases. Emerging infectious diseases                         
include those that newly appear in a population such as SARS, Zika, and Covid-19 as well as existing                                   
ones that rapidly grow in prevalence or geographic spread such as HIV/AIDS. The conditions that                             
accelerate their emergence are usually similar: demographic, environmental, and ecological conditions                     
that put people into closer contact with unknown and unfamiliar microbes or their natural hosts (e.g.                               
bats) (Morse 2001; Jones et al. 2008). The conditions that facilitate the spillover of pathogenic                             
microbes from animal to human hosts are thus not “natural” but the direct consequence of political                               
and economic decisions.  
Throughout history, ​changes in the scale of human disease, geographic prevalence, and types                         
of pathogen have evolved largely as a result of anthropogenic activity. As human populations spread                             
around the world, their relationship to the natural world changed, resulting in the emergence of new                               
or unknown infectious diseases. Since the beginning of agriculture and livestock herding some 10,000                           
10 
 
years ago, from early agrarian settlements to the military and commercial interactions between early                           
Eurasian civilizations to European imperialism, each historical transition resulted in the exchange of                         
dominant infections between peoples and between natural habitats. Over the last five centuries,                         
European colonization has caused the transoceanic transmission of often fatal infectious diseases                       
such as the—mostly—unwitting spread of measles, smallpox, and influenza in Amerindian                     
populations (McMichael 2004). Although improved nutrition and hygiene and the use of vaccines                         
and antimicrobials in the twentieth century reduced humanity’s disease burden, significant global                       
health inequalities and growing international travel and trade have accelerated the global spread of                           
infectious diseases. At the same time, clinical and technological advances were accompanied by the                           
commercialization of public health centered on the rise of profit-driven global biotechnological and                         
pharmaceutical industries (Roemer-Mahler and Elbe 2016) asserting controversial claims to                   
international property rights on essential medicines (Shadlen, Sampat, and Kapczynski 2020). By the                         
end of the twentieth century, the excessive market-driven use of antibiotics had led to notable                             
increases in antimicrobial resistance and multidrug resistant (MDR) diseases such as MDR                       
tuberculosis and the staph bacteria MRSA, prompting some scholars to speak of the end of the                               
antibiotic age.  
Modern agriculture and livestock spillovers 
It is also becoming increasingly clear that modern agriculture—often entailing deforestation and the                         
replacement of natural vegetation by crops—is changing the environment, leading to habitat                       
fragmentation and the growing risk of zoonoses. Jones and colleagues argue that agricultural                         
intensification and/or environmental change is affecting the structure and migration of wildlife                       
populations, reducing biodiversity by creating new environments that benefit specific hosts, vectors,                       
and pathogens (Jones et al. 2013). Many recently emerged zoonoses have their origins in wildlife,                             
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while interactions with humans and farm animals risk the spillover of disease-producing microbes.                         
Livestock, when it involves large numbers of animals crowding onto limited land, can become an                             
intermediate or amplifying host in which pathogens can evolve and spill into human populations.                           
Humans can also be infected directly from wildlife or vectors such as mosquitos that transmit the                               
pathogen to humans (Childs, Richt, and Mackenzie 2007). Human behavioral changes driven by                         
increasing population, economic and technological developments, and the spatial expansion of                     
agriculture and livestock are creating novel and more intensive interactions between humans,                       
livestock, and wildlife (Jones et al. 2013).  
But it is not only the biophysical interactions of humans, wildlife, and livestock that are                             
increasing the risks of zoonotic infection; infection within and across livestock also has serious                           
implications for farming economies around the world. For example, while the Chinese province of                           
Hubei was busy dealing with Covid-19, the African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV), another viral strain,                             
was transmitting largely unhindered among local pig populations as the veterinary staff that usually                           
controls this disease was quarantined. While ASFV does not directly kill humans but domestic and                             
wild pigs, it affects the human world by disrupting farming economies and ecologies (Arregui 2020).                             
The above-mentioned mad cow disease outbreak is another example of how emerging infectious                         
diseases within livestock affect international economies but also infect humans. The case of highly                           
pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza that emerged in Hong Kong in 1996-97 is particularly instructive.                           
By 2006, the bird flu strain had caused outbreaks in both poultry and wild birds in 53 countries as                                     
well as 256 human cases, including 151 deaths. Hundreds of millions of chickens, ducks, turkeys, and                               
geese either died or were culled to contain the spread of the virus. Here, too, decreased productivity                                 
and export restrictions led to significant economic losses (Kilpatrick et al. 2006). 
The future of the global political economy 
12 
 
Emerging infectious diseases as well as antimicrobial resistance in human populations and livestock                         
pose significant burdens and risks for global political economies and public health. By the end of the                                 
twentieth century, international organizations such as the United Nations were describing emerging                       
infectious diseases as a major threat to global human security. It is not a question of ​if​ another                               
pandemic will arise but ​which​ microbial strain will emerge ​when​ and ​where​. It is for this reason that                         
research on the international political economy of infectious disease emergence and its relation to the                             
demand for modern intensive agriculture rooted in modern consumption patterns is necessary.                       
Research on multispecies relations in overlapping political economies and ecologies is needed to pave                           
the way for new ways of living and coexisting with other species in a post-Covid-19 world. 
The development of a vaccine is beset with global political and economic controversies. If a                             
vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 becomes available, it will strengthen the defense of those in the world                             
privileged enough to receive vaccination. But failure to seriously consider the longer-term                       
“vital-lethal” entanglement of the human species with other species in political-economic thinking                       
will mean missing this opportunity to address the emergence of infectious diseases within and across                             
national borders. Jones and colleagues conclude that sustainable agricultural food systems that                       
minimize the risk of emerging disease will be needed to meet the food requirements of the rising                                 
global population while protecting human health and conserving biodiversity and the environment.                       
Indeed, there is a need to teach students and practitioners to think ecologically about the global                               
political economy of modern agriculture and livestock (Katz-Rosene, Kelly-Bisson, and Paterson                     
2020). In the end, Covid-19 may trigger rethinking the multispecies entanglement of the world, of                             
how we relate to microbial, animal, and other non-human species. Recent scholarship developing an                           
actor-network approach to international political economy (MacKenzie et al. 2020) is beginning to                         
engage with the complex relationality of the human and non-human worlds that constitutes the                           
global political economy. In the end, a mature, sustainable international political economy “​must                         
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come to terms with both the need for, and the needs of, the microbial species that help to make up                                       









Most products we consume—from cars and iPads to bread—are not made in any one                           
country. They are assembled through complex global value chains overseen by firms that are                           
themselves increasingly diffuse transnational entities. It is the adoption of this structure of                         
production that has driven the unprecedented increase of cross-border flows of (intra-firm) trade and                           
direct investment that characterize the international political economy of the early twenty-first                       
century (Baldwin 2016; Thies and Peterson 2015). The global spread of the SARS-Cov-2 virus has                             
placed this system under severe stress, brutally exposing the vulnerabilities of hyper-connected                       
just-in-time production networks.  
The near-collapse of some global value chains in early 2020 has led to calls by prominent                               
business and political figures to re-think the organization of global production. Against this                         
background, the Covid-19 crisis has already been posited as a watershed moment in the evolution of                               
economic globalization—as inaugurating a new stage of global capitalism. My contribution pushes                       
back against this emerging historiography. While the trends towards the partial de-globalization of                         
production are real, global production chains are here to stay. Although they are undergoing                           
important changes, most of these transformations have been underway since at least the financial                           
crisis of 2007-08. In this sense, the implications of the Covid-19 crisis for global production are                               
better understood as a continuation—and likely acceleration—of pre-existing trends, not a radical                       
break with the past. 
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Stress-test: global value chains during the Covid-19 crisis 
The shock reverberating through global value chains during the first months of 2020 came in two                               
waves. The lockdown of Wuhan and then other parts of China, a central hub in global production                                 
networks, first disrupted the flow of essential intermediate products. The sudden inability of Chinese                           
suppliers to provide essential parts forced temporary production stops in car plants, electronics                         
factories, and many other industries in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. In the second wave,                             
the extension of economic shutdowns and social distancing measures to the rest of the world,                             
including the world’s largest consumer markets, upended global demand. Producers of face masks,                         
ventilators, and other essential medical gear were overwhelmed, unable to escalate production levels                         
to ensure the supply of critical goods. On the other hand, demand for most other products collapsed,                                 
wiping out factories’ order books, filling up inventories and oil-storages, and threatening millions of                           
businesses with immediate bankruptcy. Bleak prospects forced sellers to cancel orders, triggering a                         
chain reaction that rippled through global production networks, wreaking economic havoc. Early                       
projections by the World Trade Organization and the United Nations Conference on Trade and                           
Development predict plunges of about 10-35 percent for global trade volumes and 30-40 percent for                             
direct investments in 2020. 
These shocks to global value chains were compounded by a range of protectionist policy                           
measures. Export restrictions on critical goods from medical gear and food to toilet paper were                             
imposed by more than eighty countries. Investment screening mechanisms to prevent foreign                       
takeovers of domestic industries at “fire-sale” prices were swiftly tightened. Even fervent defenders                         
of economic liberalism such as EU Commissioner Thierry Breton called for a shift in policy,                             
declaring that “now may be the time to take into account things like being too dependent on one                                   
country, one region, or one company” (in Baker McKenzie 2020). The ​Financial Times’ editorial board                             
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advocated a shift in corporate management thinking away from lean hyper-efficient just-in-time                       
production to more resilient “just-in-case” approaches (FT Editorial Board 2020). Capturing the                       
sentiment of the moment, the cover of ​The Economist’s May 15, 2020 issue tearfully waved “goodbye                               
globalization,” suggesting that the era of open global markets may fall victim to the virus as well. 
International Political Economy can help contextualize such claims made in the heat of the                           
moment. Drawing on International Relations and IPE literature that situates value chains at the                           
public/private nexus of governance (Underhill 2002; Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; Cutler,                       
Haufler, and Porter 1999), I consider two sides of the political economy of global production: the                               
strategies of multinational corporations (the supply side of jobs and products) and the configuration                           
of state-society relationships (the demand side of jobs and products and the context within which                             
multinationals operate). Important changes are indeed underway, but IPE alerts us to the extent to                             
which they represent deeper political-economic dynamics whose origins pre-date the current                     
pandemic.  
Supply-side: multinational corporations 
Multinational corporations have structurally transformed their ​modus operandi in recent decades. Their                       
wave of expansion in the aftermath of the Second World War was built on a simple recipe: “produce                                   
local, sell global” (Baldwin 2016). The scaling up of mass production and substantial reductions in                             
transport costs and tariff rates in the 1950s and 1960s allowed competitive multinationals,                         
overwhelmingly based in the Global North, to sell their products to consumers in all corners of the                                 
world. But the production of goods was still largely rooted in multinationals’ home economies,                           
structured around value chains that were identifiably national in character. The second, arguably even                           
more dramatic, wave of expansion that followed the demise of the Soviet Union was distinct in                               
several ways. Breakthroughs in information and communication technologies in the 1980s and 1990s                         
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facilitated the coordination of tasks at a distance, enabling corporations to slice up and re-locate                             
various stages of production in different places in order to benefit from the highly profitable                             
combination of “high tech and low wages” (Baldwin 2016): research and development could be                           
located in proximity to the world’s leading research centers, headquarters in low-tax jurisdictions, and                           
low- and medium-skilled manufacturing jobs in low-wage economies—all seamlessly integrated in the                       
chains of global value (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005) and wealth (Seabrooke and Wigan                           
2017). The corporate management philosophy guiding this drive prioritized perceived cost efficiency                       
over all else, prescribing an ever-finer division of production stages through outsourcing and the use                             
of just-in-time management practices to minimize “slack.”  
These were the broad dynamics that revolutionized the configuration of production chains                       
in the global economy of the 1990s and 2000s. They played an important role in accelerating the                                 
worldwide spread of SARS-CoV-2 (cf. introduction to this report). And they were hit hard when the                               
pandemic exposed bottlenecks throughout hyper-connected global production networks in early                   
2020, pushing multinationals to consider “re-shoring” production. But the pandemic itself is not the                           
immediate cause of this partial retrenchment. First, even at the peak of hyper-globalization in the                             
early 2000s, regional home-biases persisted in multinationals’ operations. Value chains were never                       
truly global. The location of many activities, especially higher-value adding ones, remained biased                         
towards MNC’s home economies typically in the Global North (Rugman 2005). Second, the risks                           
associated with privileging cost-efficiency over all else were recognized long before SARS-CoV-2.                       
The financial crisis of 2007-08 had shown the limits of conventional risk management practices in                             
predicting complex systems’ response to shocks (Oatley 2019). As a result, “resilience” had risen to                             
the top of C-suite executives’ agendas long before the pandemic. Third, and relatedly, multinational                           
corporations had not only begun talking about the need to build resilience by gradually back-sourcing                             
production towards their home economies; they had already begun doing so. Rising living standards                           
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in emerging markets were placing upwards pressures on wages while progress in robotics (“Industry                           
4.0”) had been reducing production costs in advanced economies. At the same time, changing                           
consumer preferences and growing attention to corporate social responsibility were reinforcing the                       
re-location of production chains towards higher-income economies. The Trump administration’s                   
declared intent to move towards the “de-coupling” of the Chinese and American economies                         
highlighted significant political risks on the horizon. Altogether, even if at modest levels, the                           
combination of these factors had already resulted in trends towards re-shoring, in-sourcing, and the                           
diversification of value chains before the pandemic hit. As an OECD report published four years                             
before the Covid-19 crisis stated: “[A]fter years of large-scale offshoring and outsourcing, companies                         
increasingly seem to look for more diversified sourcing strategies and consider more options in                           
structuring their production processes” (De Backer et al. 2016, 4).  
In short, corporate executives were re-considering global production prior to the pandemic.                       
Some degree of regional rebalancing increasingly made economic sense. Political forces that                       
reinforced this trend had already been set in motion well before the Covid-19 crisis. 
Demand-side: states and societies 
Multinational corporations are embedded in the societies in which they operate. The building and                           
maintaining of global value chains in the 1990s and 2000s was not only facilitated by technological                               
progress but by historically exceptional political will to accommodate and protect the institutions                         
underpinning global production networks (Linsi 2019). Having regarded foreign multinationals with                     
suspicion for decades, many governments began adopting more welcoming attitudes in the late                         
1980s, gradually replacing policies that restricted foreign investment with policies to attract it. The                           
emergence of a policy consensus favoring inward investments crucially enabled multinational                     
corporations to pursue cost-efficient outsourcing strategies (Ibid.). While the vulnerabilities of this                       
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production system exposed by the Covid-19 crisis contributed to undermining this consensus, it did                           
not trigger the transformation. The gradual erosion of the consensus had started well before. 
In stark contrast to policy elites, popular support for unfettered global markets was never                           
enthusiastic. The exacerbation of inequalities brought about by many governments’ handling of the                         
2007-08 crisis made it crumble. Distrust of large corporations, both foreign and domestic, regained a                             
foothold in public discourses around the world; the political tide had begun to turn against economic                               
internationalism. Having previously been relegated to low-key technocratic fora, the negotiation of                       
trade and investment agreements—for example the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment                     
Partnership, the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and the Trans-Pacific                     
Partnership—were re-politicized (Dür, Eckhardt, and Poletti 2020) and re-geopoliticized (Meunier                   
and Nicolaidis 2019). Disenchantment with the European project had been inflamed across member                         
states, even before the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum in the summer of 2016 (cf. Fuller, this                               
report). Trump’s election exacerbated these trends at home and abroad. Calls for the repatriation of                             
manufacturing jobs made headlines in the United States, while Chinese technology companies were                         
declared “not welcome.” At the same time, European governments promised to close tax loopholes                           
and to introduce higher taxation on foreign multinationals. Idle for decades, CFIUS—the US                         
Committee on Foreign Investments—was revived, subjecting incoming investments to renewed                   
scrutiny. A similar European Union body had come into force in April 2019.  
Back to the future? 
Opining the long-term consequences of Covid-19 for the future of global production may be                           
premature. While the pandemic has severely disrupted the operation of global value chains, we can                             
say with some confidence that the latest disruptions did not fundamentally alter the system’s                           
direction of travel. Trends towards the re-(geo)politicization of international trade and investment                       
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clearly pre-date the pandemic. While there are signs that the Covid-19 crisis has accelerated the                             
gradual “re-patriation” of economic activities, it has not caused it. How far it will go, and how the                                   
resulting re-alignment of economic blocs will look like, remains unclear at the time of writing. But the                                 
coming months may start to tell. In the meantime, International Political Economy provides a rich                             
repertoire of analytical tools to study the role of states, markets, and various spatial scales of                               










Oxfam, the world’s leading anti-poverty NGO, warned in April 2020 that the Covid-19 crisis                           
could “push over half a billion people into poverty unless urgent and dramatic action is taken”                               
(OXFAM 2020). Oxfam’s call echoed wider concerns about the pandemic undercutting transnational                       
solidarity. On the one hand, countries in the Global South are particularly vulnerable. Although                           
fiscal, health, and sanitary capacities vary considerably from one country to the next, most lack the                               
resources to mitigate the crisis and already include in their populations the lion’s share of the world’s                                 
most vulnerable people. On the other hand, the Covid-19 pandemic is striking the economies and                             
societies that have in the past been the most supportive of transnational solidarity. Many European                             
citizens champion cross-border solidarity as a moral imperative (Diven and Constantelos 2009) while                         
the largest charities in the world are based in Western Europe and North America (Stroup and Wong                                 
2017). Outside of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic                       
Co-operation and Development (OECD), China, the first country to be massively affected by                         
Covid-19, is the leading voice of South-South cooperation. This confluence of greater demand and                           
possibly smaller supply of foreign aid poses a dilemma for the future of development assistance and                               
transnational solidarity more broadly conceived. 
Against this background, this report contribution reflects on the likely evolution of foreign                         
aid flows in the medium term. I propose drawing conceptual distinctions between (1) public and                             
private aid; (2) the quantitative and qualitative aspects of aid projects; and (3) the different                             
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motivations driving aid. With these distinctions in mind, I argue that there are reasons to believe that,                                 
despite the global economic depression, aid volumes may remain relatively stable over the coming                           
years. Nevertheless, the current pandemic may re-orient aid flows away from the most urgent needs,                             
requiring scholars to focus more on the quality than quantity of international aid flows in the era of                                   
Covid-19.  
Likely effects on the volume of public aid 
The extant IPE scholarship builds on two distinct theoretical models of public aid donorship. The                             
first conceptualizes foreign aid as a “global public good” with altruistic underpinnings (cf. Mosley                           
1985). According to this conception, government generosity is conditioned by taxpayer support for                         
such spending, primarily determined by perceptions that the government can afford to be generous                           
to distant strangers but also by feelings of moral obligation towards less privileged countries (Round                             
and Odedokun 2004). Given the connection to affordability, public aid budgets should be sensitive                           
to economic downturns and shrink in times when economic growth drops and public deficits rise in                               
donor countries. Past crises have revealed that the aid budgets of the so-called Nordic countries, the                               
most generous in terms of aid as a share of GDP, show marked pro-cyclical ​tendencies (they increase                                 
with economic growth) (Hallet 2009). Confirming such models, Nordic countries are reassessing                       
their aid strategies in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, especially as the ascent of nationalistic parties                                 
has challenged the legitimacy of global redistribution. Sweden, a leading donor, has already                         
announced the reshuffling of aid priorities to tackle the crisis more efficiently (Utrikesdepartementet                         
2020). 
The second approach considers foreign aid as a form of self-interested investment serving                         
the security and economic interests of donor countries. Analyses of the drivers of leading aid donors                               
in terms of volume—the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—shows that                         
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trade value is a stronger predictor of aid budgets than level of income or budgetary deficits (Fuchs,                                 
Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014). In this perspective, economic downturns in donor countries need                         
not be accompanied by cuts in aid spending because foreign aid may in fact be serving as an                                   
important trade stabilizer, designed to sustain the donor economy by preventing the economy of                           
commercial partners (and hence their capacity to export and import goods) from collapsing                         
(Strömberg 2008; Peterson 2016). Public aid disbursements of many leading donors have been fairly                           
resilient to economic shocks (Hallet 2009), including following the 2007-08 crisis. That leading                         
donors including the US, France, Germany, and the UK in the Coronavirus Global Response                           
Pledging Conference raised an additional 9.8 billion euros—2.3 billion above target—partly for                       
humanitarian and economic support to Global South countries suggests that foreign aid remains                         
strategic enough to be preserved (European Union 2020). 
The role of private aid 
Private aid flows are barely considered in current discourses on shrinking aid budgets. Most private                             
aid is provided by individual donations. While reliable data on private aid is scarce , it is estimated                                   
that philanthropic groups such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, have accounted for less than                               
5 percent of total public aid volumes in 2017(OECD 2018). How might private donations be                             
impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic?  
Private aid has been found to be more altruistic and effective than public aid (Büthe, Major,                               
and De Souza 2012; Desai and Kharas 2008). Altruism is confirmed by the fact that—regardless of                               
the type of individual donation (charitable giving or migrant remittance)—donor revenue plays a                         
limited role in explaining both the decision and amount to donate (Carling 2008; Beldad, Snip, and                               
van Hoof 2014). Among the altruistic drivers of giving, disasters trigger an empathy effect leading                             
individuals who have experienced increased vulnerability to feel morally compelled to help people                         
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facing similar situations (Verhaert and Van den Poel 2011). Although existing studies mainly focus on                             
so-called “natural” disasters (especially floods), they show that the less victims are deemed                         
responsible for their situation, the more impact empathy has on the decision to donate (Zagefka and                               
James 2015). Experience of the pandemic may thus lead more people to donate for the first time and                                   
to direct their donations to medical humanitarian agencies.  
Connecting the dots 
In sum, the Covid-19 crisis will likely impact the volume of various kinds of aid flows from different                                   
donors in different ways. Although the existing scholarship does not furnish definitive answers, it                           
suggests possible determinants as well as hitherto largely unacknowledged interrelationships between                     
public and private forms of aid. The extant literature suggests that we can expect the evolution of                                 
public aid to depend primarily on the sensitivity of aid budgets to donor countries’ domestic                             
economic interests, and private generosity to be more strongly shaped by the salience of the sanitary                               
crisis as well as the severity of the Covid-19-induced economic crisis’ impact on household income.                             
Recent estimates suggest that some Scandinavian donor countries—typifying more crisis-sensitive                   
“public good” aid—will suffer less economic harm from the pandemic than representatives of more                           
crisis-resistant “self-interested” aid such as France, the United States, and the United Kingdom                         
(Eurostat 2020). To the extent that these projections are accurate, we can expect some decline in                               
public aid from the Nordic countries, which may be partly offset by increases in private aid (due to                                   
the empathy effect). For other key donors such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and                               
France, private aid may suffer more due to the greater economic hit on households and individual                               
donors. But this may be counter-balanced by the relatively crisis-resistant nature of public aid flows                             
from these countries given the self-interested motives driving their aid (stimulus to one’s own                           
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economy). In short, it seems possible that despite the severe worldwide economic depression, overall                           
volumes of total aid may remain relatively stable in the years to come. 
Problems below the headlines? Potential shifts in the distribution of aid  
Although the extant IPE scholarship and the experience of past (economic) crises suggest continuity                           
in aid volumes, this is not necessarily good news for vulnerable people in the Global South. The crisis                                   
is likely to reinforce the selectivity of aid projects to the detriment of the welfare and humanitarian                                 
needs of Global South societies.  
Even if absolute volumes of total aid may remain relatively stable, important shifts that risk                             
further undermining the effectiveness of foreign aid may already be underway. Early signals indicate                           
that economic difficulties in donor countries are reinforcing incentives to allocate aid on a                           
self-interested rather than needs-based basis, shifting resources away from where they are most                         
urgently needed. Three mutually reinforcing dynamics of aid selectivity can already be observed. First,                           
several leading donors including the United Kingdom, the United States, and France have announced                           
a reorientation of their overseas development aid commitments towards medical infrastructure to                       
tackle the pandemic. But Covid-19 is not the only risk facing public health systems in the Global                                 
South (cf. Voelkner, this report). Already before the pandemic, societies in the Global South were                             
advocating for a less Global North-centered conception of the global public health agenda, one that                             
would commit resources to the fight against HIV-AIDS, Ebola, polio, tuberculosis, and measles as                           
well as so-called neglected diseases such as malaria. The reorientation of priorities is likely to cause                               
more harm than good, as can already be seen in the World Health Organization’s decision to suspend                                 
vaccination campaigns to prioritize the fight against Covid-19. Second, eagerness to prevent the                         
spread of the virus by reinforcing governmental institutions in the Global South risks creating                           
additional stress on marginalized people. In particular, forcibly displaced people and discriminated                       
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minorities have no alternative than aid to see their basic needs met. The increased selectivity of aid                                 
projects is of particular concern. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian                           
Affairs, prior to the Covid crisis, estimated that nearly 168 million people will need humanitarian                             
assistance and protection in 2020—the highest number ever. Third, given the growing linkages                         
between aid and trade, investments will likely prioritize the top strategic sectors of donor                           
countries—priorities that rarely coincide with the development and welfare needs of Global South                         
societies.  
By the same token, the potential surge in private donations will likely benefit organizations                           
that have launched Covid-19 fundraising appeals. But as it relies on individual feelings of proximity                             
to other crisis-affected individuals, the empathy effect is highly discriminatory; past research on                         
disaster donations show that private donations—and even more so migrant remittances—target                     
representations of innocent and deserving victims, reinforced in charities’ fundraising appeals                     
(Zagefka and James 2015). Such patterns were seen following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia                             
when private donations in OECD countries hit record highs (Korf 2007). But the abundance of                             
targeted donations constrained NGOs in how they could use these resources, to the detriment of                             
forgotten crisis-affected communities in other countries. Looking forward, these three early trends                       
serve as a warning for policymakers and researchers of the international political economy of foreign                             








The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an intellectual authority in global politics and                         
economics (Chwieroth 2007; Clift 2019). Its advice plays a crucial role in setting the norms for                               
“sound” economic policy and shapes the policies of governments around the world. My contribution                           
focuses on ideational continuity and change at the International Financial Institutions (IFIs),                       
particularly at the IMF in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis.  
The IMF in early 2020 issued some unusual advice, counselling aggressive government                       
intervention and spending to counter the adverse economic effects of the Covid-19 crisis (IMF                           
2020). This latest round of advice seemingly contradicted the fiscal discipline and minimal                         
government spending mantras that the IMF (often vehemently) defended before the crisis. Is this a                             
temporary emergency measure? Can it lead to lasting change at the Fund? How should we study and                                 
evaluate the IMF’s thinking during the Covid-19 crisis?  
Ideational changes at the helm of the IMF will affect the lives of millions of people around                                 
the world. A shift to Keynesian ideas and policies could entail switching to a more embedded form                                 
of capitalism where the downward redistribution of income is possible and the most vulnerable                           
segments of society are protected from market dislocations and the adverse impacts of the epidemic                             
(Ban 2016). It could also mean increased government debt and loss of credibility in financial markets.                               
Conversely, advice to return to the “old normal” would require budget cuts, less government                           
investment and spending. It would mean less income redistribution to lower income groups and                           
concentration of wealth in the richest parts of society (Ban 2016). It could also mean greater ability to                                   
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attract foreign capital. As the Covid-19 crisis overhauls social, economic, and political systems, it                           
challenges us to rethink what is “sound” macro-economic policy. The IMF, with its flagship                           
publications, surveillance reports, and conditionality for loans, plays a leading role in setting crisis and                             
post-crisis economic policy.  
We can identify four ideational periods at the IMF since its inception in 1945: (1) its                               
founding as a Keynesian institution, (2) the struggle between Keynesian and neoliberal ideas in the                             
late 1960s and early 1970s; (3) the triumph of neoliberal ideas starting from the mid-1970s; and (4)                                 
the post-crisis questioning of the neoliberal consensus since 2008. Against this background, the                         
current period stands out as a likely watershed; the IMF must now make a decision. Given the                                 
sharpest-ever increases in government debt levels since the end of World War II, the Fund needs to                                 
either fundamentally re-evaluate its stance towards public debt or double-down on its commitment to                           
austerity with potentially dramatic consequences. To understand the parameters of this shifting of                         
priorities, we must study how ideas compete and prevail at the Fund.  
Four factors were central in the shifts between the above-mentioned periods (Chwieroth                       
2014; Ban 2016): (1) ideas circulating in mainstream academia and the economics profession; (2) the                             
agency of IMF staff in integrating these ideas into the Fund’s policy advice; (3) the acceptance and                                 
legitimation of these ideas by powerful member states, especially the United States; and (4) perhaps                             
most importantly, a global economic crisis preceded each shift. 
I first discuss the shift from Keynesian ideas to monetarism in the 1970s and the reverse                               
trend away from market orthodoxy after 2008. I then reflect on the strengths of the IPE literature in                                   
studying ideational continuity and change at the International Financial Institutions and how, going                         
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forward, the study of norms and ideas can be integrated with study of the material interests of                                 
powerful member states to analyze the IMF’s post-Covid-19 policies.  
Previous ideational shifts at the IMF 
Founded after the Second World War, the IMF was originally a Keynesian institution espousing                           
macroeconomic policy autonomy for borrowers and full employment via fiscal intervention (Clift                       
and Tomlinson 2012). In the 1970s, staff at the Fund began to lean towards market orthodoxy,                               
privileging balanced budgets, the cutting of state expenditures, and ensuring credibility with financial                         
markets (Ban 2016; Clift 2019). Conditionalities and quantitative targeting grew more important                       
(Dreher and Walter 2010), witnessed in spending ceilings for governments, cuts to spending in                           
education and health, and advice to governments around the world to maintain balanced budgets                           
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). By the 1980s, the IMF had become a staunch defender of                               
market-oriented policies and a “globalizer” disseminating these policies around the world (Woods                       
2006). 
The shift from the Keynesian paradigm towards monetarism in the 1970s can be traced to                             
the rise of monetarist ideas in academic circles and their wide acceptance as “appropriate economic                             
policy” (Babb 2013). Governments, especially that of the United States, adopted these ideas, giving                           
legitimacy to fiscal discipline and balanced budgets. IMF staff, both in local offices and in the                               
research department, were socialized to accept these ideas through their training and replaced                         
“old-school” staff members (Clift and Tomlinson 2012). 
In the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis, several IMF scholars noted signs of a subtle but                                 
recognizable reversal in the Fund’s rhetoric towards counter-cyclical fiscal policy activism (Clift                       
2019). In lending to Greece together with the European Central Bank and the European                           
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Commission, the IMF advised debt restructuring (Moschella 2016). But in opposition to its                         
European partners, the IMF also defended less contractionary policies than had been applied in its                             
Central and Eastern European programs (Lütz and Kranke 2014). Nevertheless, the advice to pursue                           
an active fiscal policy only applied to advanced economies. Developing countries borrowing from the                           
Fund in the same period were counselled to do “more of the same”: reduce debt and cut                                 
expenditures (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). Such contradictory advice reflected a stage of                         
“fragmented change” at the Fund (Kaya and Reay 2019)—an internal struggle between the                         
pro-Keynesian camp and the fiscal-responsibility/austerity camp. 
In the midst of the Covid-19 crisis, the Fund seems to have stepped further towards                             
Keynesianism. It is providing greater autonomy to borrowers by getting rid of conditionalities and                           
advising governments to ​spend widely and liberally (IMF 2020), thereby supporting countercyclical                       
policies to offset the adverse effects of the crisis. The key question is whether the IMF will return to                                     
market orthodoxy and austerity once the pandemic’s most immediate economic and financial threats                         
have passed or whether it will defend government spending as a way to support the demand side to                                   
sustain economic recovery—possibly also in recognition of the importance of health and social                         
welfare spending that the pandemic has highlighted.  
While history shows that crises can provide impetus to ideational change (Hall 1993), it is far                               
from guaranteed. Government intervention in the economy and support for the demand side may                           
prove to be emergency measures that will be shelved after the crisis, as largely happened after the                                 
financial crisis of 2007-08 (Blyth 2015; Schmidt and Thatcher 2014). 
IPE and ideational continuity and change at international financial institutions 
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The IPE literature on IMF politics remains divided between a materialist/rationalist and an ideational                           
camp—a reflection of the divide in the field in general (Pevehouse and Seabrooke, forthcoming). The                             
rationalist camp emphasizes the role of influential member states in shaping and influencing the                           
Fund’s policies and conditions (Copelovitch 2010; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2013; Stone 2008).                         
While its unifying argument is that economically and politically powerful countries look after their                           
allies at the Fund, it omits discussion of the ideational background of these conditions, for instance                               
that the prescription of fiscal austerity or expansion largely follows the prevailing paradigm at the                             
Fund.  
The ideational camp focuses on the agency of staff members and the role of economic                             
paradigms that shape their thinking (Ban 2015; Clift 2019; Chwieroth 2015; Nelson 2017). Scholars                           
emphasize that IMF staff members follow recent publications in the field, pride themselves for being                             
up to date on cutting-edge research, and integrate these ideas into their own “clinical economist”                             
practice (Clift 2019). But in doing so, ideational scholars largely view the IMF and its staff as an                                   
“island”; member states and their influence on the ascendance of certain ideas do not feature                             
prominently in the analysis. 
To better understand the current critical juncture in IMF politics, we need to integrate these                             
two strands of research. Tools and insights from the materialist camp can show us how and when                                 
influential states use their institutional and informal powers to promote austerity or stimulus,                         
especially for their allies. The ideas and policies promoted by the United States (Stone 2008) and the                                 
other G-5 countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan) will likely carry particular                         
weight (Copelovitch 2010). The ideational camp is better equipped to study the processes through                           
which ideas and norms emanating from influential member states find their way at the Fund. Its                               
insights allows us to study how material interests are defended through ideas and norms at the IMF,                                 
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and how ideas about appropriate economic policy shape how states conceive of their material                           
interests (cf. Fuller, this report).  
The Covid-19 crisis is opening up broad questions about governance (Voelkner, this report).                         
Among them, questions about the intellectual authority of the IMF will have far-reaching                         
consequences for crisis and post-crisis economic management. We can expect to see a competition of                             
ideas, particularly between those advocating fiscal stimulus and balanced budgets—in academia, in                       
the IMF’s influential member states, and within the Fund itself. While the IPE literature is well                               
equipped to study these processes with its existing tools, what is necessary, at least in studying the                                 
Covid-19 crisis, is not just “constructive non-engagement” (Pevehouse and Seabrooke, forthcoming)                     










The decade-long European debate over joint debt instruments—either as “Eurobonds” or                     
“Coronabonds”—has at its roots a paradox. Most participants, even those currently opposed to                         
issuing joint debt, admit that joint debt instruments make a great deal of technical sense. At the same                                   
time, most participants conceded that such instruments are extremely unlikely to be realized in the                             
near future—that is, until the SARS-CoV-2 virus appeared in Europe. My contribution addresses                         
three interrelated questions: (1) Why is there so much divergence between what “should” and what                             
“will” happen? (2) How does political economy help us understand this dynamic? (3) Might the                             
Coronavirus represent a critical juncture from which continuity gives way to change? I address these                             
three questions in turn.  
The European debate over joint debt 
In 2020, the debate over so-called Coronabonds has emphasized solidarity—a relatively new focus                         
prompted by changed circumstances. Although solidarity was not entirely ignored during the first                         
Eurobond debate in the early 2010s, the arguments were more technical in nature. Eurobonds were                             
proposed as a way to secure the eurozone against sudden stops, when capital flows into a country go                                   
into reverse as creditors flee from exposure to crisis-stricken countries. Eurobonds were also a means                             
of breaking the “doom loop” between governments and their domestic banking systems, whereby a                           
sovereign default bankrupts the national financial system and bailing out the national financial system                           
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bankrupts the sovereign. The new instruments were meant to serve as nearly risk-free assets                           
circulating across the eurozone, analogous to Treasury instruments in the United States. If a country                             
ran into fiscal trouble, there would be less incentive for foreign creditors to withdraw their funds.                               
Banks would also be less exposed to the creditworthiness of their own government (see extensive                             
discussion in De la Dehesa 2011; European Commission 2011; Jones 2010, 2012; Monti 2011). 
The technical argument was generally accepted—even by those who argued against the                       
creation of joint debt instruments. A European Parliament report on the idea of Eurobonds began its                               
executive summary by stating: “Eurobonds are today a subject of heated debate among euro area                             
policy makers when trying to find a proper exit to the present Euro sovereign debt crisis, even if it is                                       
quite clear that they have more pros than cons” (De la Dehesa 2011, 4). ​The report goes on to clarify                                       
that the problem with Eurobonds is not technical but political—a conclusion broadly echoed in the                             
European Commission’s (2011) own report on the subject. Both the European Parliament and the                           
European Commission thus acknowledged the robust technical case for Eurobonds while casting                       
serious doubt on the likelihood of them becoming reality. Even Germany, often the key opponent of                               
issuing joint debt, argued that its opposition was not absolute. Key figures such as Bundesbank head                               
Jens Wiedmann and Chancellor Angela Merkel viewed joint debt instruments as a “final step” to a                               
European Union that jointly makes fiscal decisions (i.e. political union) (EurActiv 2012). In short,                           
there was relatively little disagreement over ​either ​the notion that Eurobonds make technical sense—​or                           
the notion that they are unlikely to materialize anytime soon. This begs the “why” question. How                               
much needs to change before the opposition gives in?  
The contribution of Political Economy  
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These are questions to which political economy is well-suited. Susan Strange, one of the founders of                               
1
contemporary IPE, was fond of approaching events by asking “cui bono?”—who benefits? In its                           
contemporary form, political economists have broadened this question from its material                     
understanding to one that also considers the psychological drivers of human behavior                       
(Hafner-Burton, Hughes, and Victor 2013; Herrmann 2017). 
On the material level, adopting a common debt instrument will have distributional effects.                         
Although in theory ​everyone ​will benefit from reducing the risks of eurozone fragmentation, this                           
benefit is much larger for countries that bond markets see as riskier and which are more likely to                                   
suddenly lose access to capital markets. For the economically troubled countries of the eurozone                           
“periphery,” the distributional impact of creating Eurobonds is therefore positive. Interest rates on                         
their borrowing would fall as they benefit from the added security offered by the credit ratings of                                 
Germany and the Netherlands.  
For Germany and its allies, the result would be the opposite. They would likely face higher                               
interest rates as markets price the added risk of Germany’s new liabilities—especially considering the                           
inclusion of countries with poor reputations for creditworthiness. The cost of mutually guaranteeing                         
eurozone debt has been trumpeted in headlines as billions per year (Cohen 2011). Numerous                           
challenges to the German Constitutional Court have centered on the constitutional impermissibility                       
of mutualizing liability as it would effectively expropriate German taxpayers (Pidd 2011; Inman                         
2020). For many, this is where the discussion of Germany’s position ends (Frieden and Walter 2017):                               
1 ​In analyzing the eurozone, there is arguably little distinction between comparative and international political                            
economy. “European political economy” builds on insights from both and cannot be characterized as one or                               




it is manifestly not in Germany’s economic interest to support debt mutualization—so why should                           
the country do so?  
This tidy story is not without problems. An area of political economy research that has been                               
growing rapidly over the past decade—particularly among Europeanists—emphasizes the ideational                   
causes of outcomes. Drilling into what factors determine individual support or opposition to joint                           
European debt, values and identity appear to matter more than material interests.  
First, the academic and political debate over fiscal policy in the European Economic and                           
Monetary Union has been highly moralized, dividing fiscally conservative high-savings “saints” and                       
fiscally looser high-spending “sinners” (Matthijs and McNamara 2015). Mario Monti, the former                       
Italian Prime Minister, famously characterized German policy by saying, “for Germans, economics is                         
still part of moral philosophy” (in Kramer 2015). As is often noted, the German (and Dutch) words                                 
for “debt” and “shame” are the same—a connection underscored when Angela Merkel explicitly                         
promotes the stereotypically frugal Swabian housewife as a model for the country (Kollewe 2012). In                             
short, borrowing excessively is bad behavior which must be discouraged. Softening the consequences                         
of bad behavior, the thinking goes, invites moral hazard.  
While this morality tale is dominant in Germany (Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2017),                         
it is not universal. Polling illustrates that Germans who adhere to more altruistic moral systems are                               
more likely to support measures such as bailouts, whereas those adhering to more retributionist                           
moral systems tend to oppose them (Rathbun, Powers, and Anders 2019). In other words, while                             
support for the status quo does not vary substantially across political parties or material conditions, it                               
does vary across groups expressing different values. Identity also appears to play a major role in                               
shaping German attitudes toward the country’s foreign economic policy. Interestingly, ​support for EU                         
integration in general does not predict an individual’s attitude toward bailouts (Blum and van Treeck                             
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2019) while emotional ​attachment to Europe does. This is true for both ordinary voters (Chalmers and                               
Dellmuth 2015) and parliamentary elites (Degner and Leuffen 2016). 
In short, individual positions on whether Germany should embrace Eurobonds are largely                       
shaped by ideas and identity. Is debt bad? How does the risk of financial moral hazard compare to                                   
the moral hazard of inaction in the face of suffering? How do these judgments change according to                                 
the level of European identity expressed by Germans? This intersection between how individuals                         
construct their interests and how collectives like nation-states then choose to define the “national”                           
interest is an area ripe with scholarly questions. While one political economy account of the                             
Eurobond debate provides a parsimonious explanation for Germany’s behavior, another suggests                     
that we have much work to do in connecting the macro and micro levels of analysis.  
Continuity vs. change 
All of this suggests that, when examining the likelihood of discontinuity with the recent past, we need                                 
to examine both material interests and the possibility of a transformation in how society constructs                             
its interests. The question with Covid and Coronabonds is whether the crisis has changed either.  
Taking the macro view, Germany’s national preferences towards cooperation would likely                     
change if the costs of non-cooperation—such as the potential dissolution of the eurozone—become                         
more evident. There have been signs of this amidst the Coronavirus, with former Bundestag                           
President Norbert Lammert arguing that Germany’s opposition to Eurobonds has “caused greater                       
political damage” than it has done good (Grüll 2020). Likewise, former leader of the Social                             
Democratic Party Sigmar Gabriel tweeted in March 2020: “rather Euro- and Coronabonds than a                           
destroyed EU.” Germany, if it values the euro, should be more willing to act to save it.  
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On the micro level, the moral context of the current crisis is quite different from the 2010s.                                 
One can argue that austerity programs in Italy, Greece, Spain, and elsewhere were technically                           
necessary and ethically defensible. But whereas the previous crisis could be seen as self-inflicted, it is                               
more of a stretch to blame countries for being unprepared for the economic consequences of a                               
global pandemic. There is now a trade-off between different “moral hazards.” On one side is the                               
conventional financial understanding of moral hazard. On the other is the moral hazard implied by                             
allowing more vulnerable parts of the European Union to disproportionately suffer when some of                           
this suffering could be alleviated.  
Whatever the outcomes of cooperation in sharing the costs of the Coronavirus pandemic,                         
they will shine a light on whether and how the construction of interests can change. Preliminary                               
research shows that German attitudes toward joint debt are malleable (Baccaro, Bremer, and                         
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A twist on Johannes Vermeer’s ​Girl with a Pearl Earring​, in which an outdoor security alarm                               
stands in for the famous pearl earring, was itself given a contemporary twist as the SARS-CoV-2                               
virus swept over the English city of Bristol in April 2020. A surgical mask was attached to the ​Girl                                     
with the Pierced Eardrum, either by the original painter— ​the street artist known to the world as                               
Banksy—or by another unidentified individual. This evolving artwork and the “known unknowns”                       
surrounding its creator(s) illustrate the on-going push-and-pull between privacy and surveillance that                       
students and scholars of International Relations are well positioned to investigate in the evolving                           
context of the Covid-19 pandemic.  
International Political Economy approaches are particularly helpful for making sense of new                       
and existing forms of surveillance catalyzed in international responses to the SARS-CoV-2 virus.                         
Zooming in on evolving public-private partnerships between firms, governments, and international                     
organizations, IPE provides a ​micro​scope for foregrounding highly technical developments that often                       
remain as invisible as viruses. Zooming out on the wider implications for power, legitimacy, and                             
governance, IPE provides a ​macro​scope for situating the obscure and arcane within profoundly                         
political dynamics. In combination, these lenses can generate nuanced insights into ​the global                         
expansion of surveillance and practices to safeguard privacy.  
In what follows, I show how “regulatory” and “everyday” IPE approaches provide, and help                           
connect, micro- and macro-level analyses of efforts by state and non-state actors to harness novel                             
technologies in the fight against Covid-19. I zoom in on a prominent set of “distributed ledger”                               
technologies—more widely known as blockchains—to illustrate how they are being repurposed to                       
track and trace the spread of SARS-CoV-2 while both expanding ​and ​resisting global surveillance. I                             
conclude with a call for further IPE engagement with the interdiscipline of surveillance studies,                           
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where notions of “digital sousveillance” (Burke 2020) can help push scholarship to “trace the tracers”                             
in ways that draw out the prescriptive, contingent, and political nature of technological practices in                             
responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Regulatory and everyday surveillance in the global political economy 
IPE perspectives can broadly be divided into “regulatory” and “everyday” approaches (Hobson and                         
Seabrooke 2007; Elias and Rethel 2016). The former helps draw attention to the top-down and                             
prescriptive nature of global economic surveillance practices while the latter emphasizes the                       
bottom-up and socio-technical interactions underpinning efforts across sectors of the global political                       
economy to track, trace, and target mundane activities.  
International organizations routinely monitor both member- and non-member states.                 
Multilateral surveillance by the International Monetary Fund and international bodies like the                       
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank aggregate country                       
performance on economic and political metrics into quarterly or yearly reports that then rank and                             
benchmark nation-states against one another. Despite criticism that such practices tend to advance                         
specific conceptions of “correct” behavior (Broome and Quirk 2015), top-down forms of global                         
surveillance have progressively expanded in the wake of previous crises (Pauly 1997). For instance,                           
the surveillance practices of the Financial Stability Board were enhanced by the Group of 20 (G20)                               
following the 2007-08 global financial meltdown (Kranke and Yarrow 2019).  
The operation and expansion of regulatory forms of global economic surveillance are far                         
from automatic. Seemingly abstract global processes are underpinned by concrete yet typically                       
mundane interactions between state and non-state actors as well as between human actors and                           
non-human objects. “Everyday” IPE approaches help to draw attention to the varying forms of                           
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agency exercised in developing, maintaining, and expanding the socio-technical systems enabling the                       
creation and collection of formal statistics harnessed and acted on in regulatory forms of surveillance.                             
Bottom-up approaches help reveal how formal indicators and measures are underpinned by a host of                             
increasingly digital ​in​formal interactions, including everyday social and work-related communications                   
that have gone online since the pandemic’s outbreak. Forms of “dataveillance”—of the “digital                         
traces” created and left through online interactions—remind us that surveillance is not a quarterly or                             
yearly affair but one involving the “continuous tracking of (meta)data for unstated preset purposes”                           
(Van Dijck 2014). Shifting the analytical lens onto what has become second-by-second digital                         
surveillance while recalling the role of humans and non-humans in enabling and sustaining these                           
practices helps to see them as contingent and contestable. The reliance of surveillance practices on                             
people and technologies serves to remind us that these fundamentally ​socio-​technical ​systems can be                           
altered and repurposed. Global surveillance, in short, is far from an automatically expanding set of                             
processes. 
Top-down and bottom-up IPE approaches can usefully be combined to generate meso-level                       
analyses that draw out both the prescriptive and socio-technical nature of global surveillance as a                             
fluid set of practices. Below I zoom in on one set of technologies being repurposed to both expand                                   
and resist global surveillance in responses to the Covid-19 pandemic.  
Covid-19 (anti)surveillance experiments  
State and non-state actors were already experimenting with emergent technologies to address global                         
challenges before the SARS-CoV-2 virus (Bernards et al. 2020). In responding to the current                           
pandemic, blockchain technologies have been particularly prominent. These “distributed ledger                   
technologies” enable encrypted digital transactions to be undertaken, verified, and published in                       
“blocks” that, when linked together sequentially, form permanent, tamper-proof “chains” or shared                       
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databases that all users can access but no one user can alter on their own. The technology has a                                     
mysterious aura as its blueprint originated in a white paper by a still unknown author(s) calling for a                                   
global electronic cash system in which one can “see that someone is sending an amount to someone                                 
else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone” (Nakamoto 2008, 6). Bitcoin’s use of                             
blockchain technology since 2009 has spawned numerous experiments with financial privacy. But just                         
as “privacy coins” were being further developed and refined, overviews of transactions provided by                           
blockchain technology were underpinning efforts to harness the technology to extend the very global                           
economic surveillance practices that Bitcoin and “cryptocurrencies” were developed to resist. Global                       
regulators sought to use “fire to fight fire” (Lagarde 2018) by encouraging the blockchain                           
“intelligence industry” to develop profiling services for police organizations and governments around                       
the world. Meanwhile, Central Bank-backed Digital Currencies (CBDCs) were being developed to                       
provide real-time overviews of economic transactions within and across economies that the exchange                         
of physical cash or coins could never feasibly provide. Yet other blockchain-based experiments                         
sought to track, trace, and target the circulation of objects like parcels as well as human labor across                                   
complex global supply chains (Bernards et al. 2020). It is within this rapidly evolving context that                               
blockchains became a “go-to technology” underpinning both top-down and bottom-up responses to                       
the Covid-19 pandemic. Combining insights from “everyday” and “regulatory” IPE approaches                     
provides a meso-level understanding of the connections between these efforts, illustrating the                       
push-and-pull of surveillance and privacy in responses to the pandemic.  
Bottom-up blockchain-based technological experimentation was initially catalyzed as the                 
SARS-CoV-2 virus spread first across China and then around the world in 2020. In the first weeks of                                   
February 2020 alone, two dozen applications of the technology emerged for tracking the circulation                           
of personal protective equipment, insurance claims, and health data. Close linkages between these                         
bottom-up efforts—many of which sought to protect personal privacy—and top-down state                     
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coordination quickly appeared. Both small and large technology firms involved in blockchain-based                       
responses to the pandemic partnered with the Chinese state’s Blockchain-based Service Network                       
(BSN) launched in March 2020. The country’s central bank meanwhile began piloting a                         
blockchain-backed version of a digital yuan, the Digital Currency Electronic Payment, in several                         
cities. While the ostensible purpose was to eliminate viral spread via physical currency exchange,                           
these trials also sparked fears that the real-time tracking and monitoring of payments would inform                             
the social credit scores of Chinese citizens (Mukherjee 2020). 
Interactions between top-down and bottom-up experiments with blockchain elsewhere                 
highlight the evolving push-and-pull of global surveillance and privacy practices within                     
socio-technical responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. At the global level, the World Health                         
Organization announced plans in March 2020 to develop a blockchain-based “platform” for safely                         
storing anonymous health data called MiPasa, to be built by large technology firms like IBM in                               
partnership with financial services firms. At the same time, more bottom-up partnerships were                         
formed between technology researchers, social movements, and start-ups seeking to repurpose                     
blockchains for tracing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 without compromising individual privacy. For                       
example, University of Cape Town academics, privacy activists, and a South African “corporate                         
venture builder” called The Delta released Covid-ID, an open source app to ostensibly “track the                             
virus, not the people” (CEO Louis Buys in Lourie 2020). This and similar blockchain-based apps                             
provide users the option of storing their health data on their smartphones or in “wallet” platforms                               
controlled by governments or participating banks that confirm user identity and health status. Such                           
connections between “everyday” efforts to ensure privacy and the “regulatory” emphasis on                       
confirming personal identity were evident across a number of wider public-private configurations                       
formed to coordinate blockchain-based responses to the pandemic. For instance, the COVID Task                         
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Force of the International Association for Trusted Blockchain Applications, a grouping of small and                           
large technology companies, was backed by the European Commission. 
Combining “everyday” and “regulatory” IPE approaches can help us to make sense of the                           
prescriptive and socio-technical nature of rapidly evolving efforts to repurpose a set of emergent                           
technologies to both protect privacy and pursue surveillance. Zooming in on interactions between                         
public and private actors—as well as their interactions with novel technologies— ​draws attention                         
to micro-level processes seeking to materialize particular prescriptions of how their users should or                           
should not act. By zooming out and situating the fundamentally socio-technical nature of these                           
experiments within wider efforts to expand and resist surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2015), IPE                         
scholarship can help to draw attention to the contingent and unpredictable push-and-pull of                         
surveillance and privacy practices unfolding in responses to the global pandemic.  
Step into, out of, and beyond the surveillance shop 
In tracking and tracing on-going experiments by state and non-state actors with emergent                         
technologies like blockchains, IPE approaches can usefully draw attention to the socio-technical and                         
prescriptive underpinnings of complex, rapidly evolving surveillance and privacy practices. “Tracing                     
the tracers” can also benefit from integrating approaches like “digital sousveillance” from other                         
interdisciplines such as surveillance studies (Burke 2020). Efforts to observe and analyze both the                           
mundane and the spectacular can also take inspiration from Thierry Guettta, the Frenchman featured                           
in the 2010 Banksy-directed documentary ​Exit through the Gift Shop. In recording his life events,                             
Guetta chronicled the expansion of street art from illicit behavior to a lucrative form of investment.                               
While stepping into the (anti)surveillance shops developing in the wake of the pandemic, IPE                           
scholarship can also step out and beyond these complex and rapidly evolving transnational                         
partnerships to inject wider perspectives on questions of power, legitimacy, authority, and                       
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governance. Instead of “exiting through the gift shop” as Guetta eventually does by creating and                             
selling his own street art to become a millionaire, IPE students and scholars should help to situate                                 
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